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Abstract 
 
Information is very important for organizations in deciding whether to change their strategy. Hence, 
information processing is a fundamental task, which should be done effectively. However, the vast 
amount of available information coupled with the limited cognitive capabilities make such activities 
less effective than desired. To reduce mental effort required to collect and analyze information, 
organizations employ various biases and heuristics. Researchers, both in psychology and strategic 
decision-making, point out the persistence of biases. Such literature streams, however, mostly pay 
attention to the occurrence of one bias at a time even though some biases are dependent on each 
other and occur simultaneously. The proposition of this paper is that the use of biases and heuristics 
reinforce the factors leading to their use. The importance of this proposition is shown with a system 
dynamics model by demonstrating that the isolated effects of two biases generate different results than 
their combined effect.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
There has been an ample amount of attention to psychological biases and heuristics in the 
literature streams of psychology and strategic decision-making. Various experiments have 
been designed to show the existence of biases in different decision-making settings. 
Researchers have devised classifications of biases based on the decision-making stage in 
which they occur. Empirical work has shown that biases exist and have effects in different 
stages of decision-making. Yet, the focus has been on individual biases rather than the joint 
effects of multiple biases occurring simultaneously. The starting point of this work is the 
assertion that biases are related to one another. They are not independent processes that occur 
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 in their own account, but their occurrence depends on the occurrence of other biases. 
Showing these links or dependencies amongst biases is important to improve our 
understanding of the decision-making process. Moreover, recognizing these dependencies 
could help us better understand the causes and consequences of biases and ways of 
eliminating (or at least, decreasing) their adverse effects. 
 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold.  
The first purpose is to show that looking at biases jointly generates different insights than 
looking at them individually. We have chosen strategic change as the decision-making 
process to focus on. The biases involved are those that occur in information processing as 
organizations decide on whether to change. Through system dynamics modeling, we will 
show that looking at the change process by looking at the effects of multiple biases 
simultaneously generates a different insight into the consequences of change. Our aim is not, 
however, to show the totality of the links amongst all the biases. The literature and the 
number of biases are far too large for that. Our purpose is to demonstrate that it is important 
to take the interdependencies amongst biases into consideration.  
The second purpose is to look at the phenomenon of commitment to strategy in more 
detail. As will be shown with the model, commitment to a given strategy has an important 
effect on the change behavior of organizations. Yet, in the literature, there is controversy on 
how commitment escalates. We will show that different opinions regarding commitment lead 
to quite different consequences. We will also look into the similarity between commitment to 
strategy and inertia concepts that come from different literature streams. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will focus on the importance of 
information for strategic change and the biases in information processing. It is in this section 
that we develop our proposition. In section 3, the model structure is explained. Section 4 is on 
model analysis. In section 5, we will look into the concept of commitment of strategy. 
Finally, section 6 we will present the limitations of the model and analysis and present the 
conclusions.  
2. Importance of Information for Strategic Change and Biases in Information 
Processing 
 
Information is one of the key components of strategic decision-making. Ungson et. al. (1981, 
p117) define information as “stimuli (or cues) capable of altering an individual’s expectations 
and evaluation in problem solving and decision making”. Organizations spend much time in 
gathering, storing, analyzing, and communicating information during their decision-making 
activities. Some researchers even argue that information gathering and processing are more 
crucial to the success of the firm than strategic decision making itself (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). 
 
Organizations need two types of information: environmental (external) information (to be 
able to detect trends and changes in their environment and make decisions) and internal 
information (to evaluate their performance). Organizations need relevant, timely, and 
accurate information about their environment. Successful organizations are those that can 
devise strategies and structures to fit the environmental conditions. Since organizations 
perceive their environment through environmental information, formulation of an appropriate 
strategy depends on identifying the relevant environmental factors that will help detect the 
important trends in the environment (Ungson et. al. 1981). Along with understanding their 
environment, organizations also need to assess their current performance. Internal 
 information is required for the latter. Information on the performance levels, resource 
availability etc. is very important for identifying how the organization is functioning given its 
current strategy and determining whether the organization is in alignment with its goals. The 
mixture of internal and external information would help the organization identify the gaps in 
performance/fit and possible adaptation(s) it has to make.  
 
Even though information processing is very crucial to the survival of organizations and its 
importance is recognized, the process is not without problems. There are many factors that 
seem to render the identification of relevant information ineffective. First, there is an 
overwhelming number of potential information sources in the environment (Choudhury and 
Sampler, 1997) each including enormous amounts of information. Ideally, human beings 
should pay attention to cues proportional to the importance and utility of different cues 
(Sterman, 2000). However, decision-makers have limited scanning capacity and limited 
resources. The mismatch between the amount of available information and the limited 
information processing capabilities leads to unfavorable circumstances such as information 
overload and stress (figure 2, the factors leading to the use of biases and heuristics). To 
simplify the stressful situation faced and to reduce the mental effort required, decision-
makers resort to biases and heuristics (in figure 2, solid line from the factors leading to the 
use of biases and heuristics to the use of biases and heuristics). As a result, they pay attention 
to information selectively. For instance, they choose to acquire and use information that 
confirms previously implemented policies (Staw and Ross, 1987; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). 
Or they gather more of the same kind of information to increase confidence in their judgment 
(Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981) rather than collecting information to identify what is really 
happening in the environment. Such simplifying procedures (e.g., looking for confirming 
evidence or using simple mental maps) could, in the short run, take away the pressures 
caused by information overload, but they obstruct the identification of relevant information 
by restricting the focus of the organization and lead to biases. 
 
The extant amount of literature on information processing biases focuses on the factors 
leading to the use of biases and heuristics and the consequences of individual biases. As such, 
the interactions between the biases and the interdependencies amongst them have not been 
looked at. We believe that the use of biases and heuristics further reinforce the factors leading 
to the use of these biases and heuristics (Figure 2, dashed line). This link does not mean that 
use of heuristics will affect all the factors identified in the box. We mean that the use of these 
biases can further increase the stressful situation and the subsequent mental effort required. 
And as a result, the use of the same or other heuristics and biases will be reinforced. Hence, 
we propose that the biases and heuristics literature should look at the occurrence of biases 
simultaneously rather than analyzing one bias in isolation from all the other ongoing biases.  
  
 
Figure 2: Positive feedback loop reinforcing the factors leading to the use of biases and heuristics 
 
We, of course, need to show that such a proposition (i.e. looking at joint effects of biases) is 
indeed important. If we can demonstrate that isolated effects of two separate biases generate 
different results than the combined effect of these biases then we can say that our proposition 
is of importance. In a sense, we are testing our proposition by using a system dynamics model 
and showing that occurrence of one bias vs. multiple biases in information processing for a 
strategic change process leads to different outcomes for the organization. Hence, any analysis 
of strategic change that lacks the inclusion of the interdependencies amongst biases would 
generate different results than one where such mechanisms are considered. This would mean 
that if such interdependencies exist they should be taken into consideration.   
 
In the following section, we will explain the structure of the model used for analysis.  
3. Structure of the Model 
 
In this paper, our concern is the joint effect of information processing biases on the decision 
of whether to go on with a strategy or change it. We will now look at the structure of the 
model and explain the change-generating mechanisms and the biases involved. 
 
3.1 Base Model: Change-generating mechanisms 
 
Organizations change their strategies if they feel pressure to change. The most important 
factor leading to the accumulation of this pressure is the performance problems the 
organization might be experiencing. The fit of the organization’s strategy determines the 
performance of the organization2. A strategy is appropriate or fit when it is in alignment with 
                                                   
2 There are two dominant views on the determinants of organizational performance. The contingency theory 
emphasizes the importance of organization-environment fit as a determinant of performance, with the view that 
the appropriate organization form is contingent on the characteristics required by the environment (White and 
Hamermesh, 1981, Drazin and van de Ven, 1985). Thus, to be effective, the organization should achieve a fit 
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 the competitive conditions the organization is embedded in. If a change takes place in the 
environment and this change would generate a misfit between the organization’s strategic 
orientation and the competitive conditions, this would be a reason for strategic change 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). As long as the strategic orientation of the organization fits 
the one required by the environment, the organization converges around its current strategic 
orientation. If for some reason (e.g. change in the environment) the strategic orientation turns 
out to be inappropriate then the pressure would start accumulating leading to the start of 
organizational change. Once the changes started are implemented, the misfit can be 
eliminated. This process that leads to the generation of strategic change is shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Change-generating loop 
 
Fit of strategy – signifies the appropriateness, effectiveness, alignment or fit of an 
organization’s strategy with respect to the external environment. This is a state variable, 
because it is the accumulation of the effects of past strategic changes and the changes in the 
environment. It ranges between 0 and 100. Zero means that the strategy of the organization is 
totally in misfit with its environment whereas 100 signifies perfect fit. Fit can change in two 
ways: change in strategy (implementation of the ongoing changes) and environmental change 
(e.g. a new law, a better technology, a new product). The fit of the strategy determines the 
performance. Hence, the performance gap actually refers to the amount of misfit of strategy. 
It is assumed that the organization strives for perfect performance (of 100).  
 
Pressure to change – signifies the amount of pressure the organization experiences regarding 
whether to change or not. Pressure to change is a state variable since it signifies the 
cumulative pressure that builds up over time. The main source of pressure is the average 
performance gap (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). As the average performance gap increases 
so does the pressure to change.  
                                                                                                                                                              
between the environmental requirements and organizational strategy and structure. Congruency theory, on the 
other hand, stresses the importance of internal consistency between elements of structure (Child, 1972). How 
well the organization functions internally would affect how well it performs. In this paper, we have decided to 
limit ourselves to the contingency theory to keep the model simple. Hence, performance is determined by the fit 
of strategy. 
  
 Change in process – signifies the amount of ongoing changes in the organization. It is 
measured in terms of the amount of fit gap to be closed as a result of the on-going changes. 
Change in process increases as new changes are started due to the accumulated pressure to 
change and decreases as the changes are completed.  
 
3.2 Biases and heuristics 
 
We will now move our attention to the biases that are represented in this model. We do not 
claim to include all the biases into our model. The model should be seen as a first attempt in 
identifying the linkages between information processing biases. The totality of the 
relationships and loops that are in the model are shown in figure 4. For the full model 
specification is included in the appendix. 
Below, we will look at external and internal information processing separately. However, 
we first need to explain the commitment to strategy concept since it has an effect on both the 
external and internal information processing.  
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Figure 4: Biases in change process – The whole model 
 
Commitment to strategy – signifies the extent of support for the current strategy. There are 
two main streams of literature that explain how commitment to a certain action increases. The 
trial and error learning literature assumes that behavior associated with success is repeated 
whereas behavior associated with failure is not (Lant and Mezias, 1992; Levitt and March 
1988; Lant and Hurley, 1999). The escalation of commitment literature, on the other hand, 
states that even unsatisfactory performance leads to persistence and further commitment to a 
course of action3 (e.g. Staw, 1981, Staw and Ross 1987). The latter literature stream states 
that decision makers want to justify their prior action by committing more resources as a 
means of showing that they were not mistaken by their initial decision. Moreover, people 
seem to be attached to sunk costs (money, time, and other resources) that have already been 
devoted to a (losing) course of action. Even though such persistence may be beneficial in 
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 stable environments, in the face of environmental change, it might prove to be harmful since 
it would disable the organization from changing.  
 In this paper, we represent this concept as commitment to strategy. Commitment is a 
stock variable since it builds up as a result of previous devotions of the decision-maker to the 
particular strategy. We assume that commitment increases continuously over time (with a 
time delay of approximately 1 year). This assumption reflects the idea that as the organization 
continues to use the same strategy, more time and resources are devoted to that strategy and 
hence, the commitment will increase. At the same time, commitment can decrease as well. 
Commitment of an organization is to a given strategy. When a withdrawal from a strategy 
takes place (i.e., if the strategy is changed partially or abandoned completely) then the 
commitment should decrease accordingly. Hence, in the model, commitment decreases 
proportional to the amount of changes made to the strategy4. If the changes made are large so 
will be the decrease in commitment.  
 It should be pointed out that we are taking the escalation of commitment literature (rather 
than the trial and error learning literature) as a basis for our commitment construct. Hence, 
possible effects of performance on escalation are not represented in the structure. 
Performance effects on (de-)escalation are a matter of debate in the commitment literature. 
We will come back to this issue later in section 5. 
 Commitment to strategy has effects on both external and internal information processing. 
We will first look at its influence on external processing and then, internal processing. 
 
Biases in external information processing – Confirmation bias and (over)confidence –  
External information processing refers to the search for environmental information to 
determine whether the organizational strategy is fit to the environment. It has been shown 
previously that individuals and organizations look for confirming information. This is also 
known as the confirmation trap, “individuals tend to seek confirmatory information for what 
they think is true and neglect the search for disconfirmatory evidence” (Bazerman, 1998). 
What is important for our purpose, however, is why people search for confirming evidence. 
Caldwell and O’Reilly (1982) state “aside from justifying one’s actions through continued 
resource allocation, trapped decision makers may also buttress their choices by actively 
seeking out supportive information to rationalize their position and by constructing 
arguments that justify their choice and undermine alternative approaches that might have 
been selected”. Kiesler and Sproull (1982) state that organizations value their commitment to 
their policies and procedures more than data. They have shown that managers accept 
environmental information that confirms their beliefs to be diagnostic and they do not pay 
attention to disconfirming information: “Motivationally driven social cognition theories 
would suggest that even had the [disconfirming] information been available, executives 
would have either attacked its validity or ignored it because of their commitment to their own 
program” (p558). They, moreover, state that when managers have heavily invested in any 
situation, they are likely to discount information about the environmental changes detrimental 
to that situation. Hence, if decision-makers believe in a certain course of action then the 
information processing will be directed at the confirming evidence disregarding the 
disconfirming information (Staw and Ross 1987; Caldwell and O’Reilly 1982; Conlon and 
Parks, 1987).  
 Along with the effect of commitment, another information biasing takes place due to 
information overload, which is caused by the lack of balance between available information 
and information processing capacity (Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; O’Reilly, 1980). This 
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change that has been made to the strategy. 
 overload can be overwhelming, especially if the organization perceives itself to be under 
threat. Smart and Vertinsky (1977, see pages 640-641) have proposed that under stress, the 
cognitive abilities5 and information processing abilities are reduced, leading to information 
overload which decreases the quality of information. The threat-rigidity theory (Staw et. al. 
1981) also points to the linkages between threat/stress and information processing 
capabilities: “a threat may result in restriction of information processing, such as narrowing 
in the field of attention, a simplification in information codes, or a reduction in the number of 
channels used” (p502). When the threat is felt, the information search decreases due to the 
overloading of communication channels. Organizations rely upon prior expectations and 
hence, restrict their information processing to information that supports the chosen policy. 
The search results in information that is similar to that of the past (Starbuck et al., 1978).   
 In the model, both relationships are represented (see figure 5). Increase in commitment to 
strategy leads to an increase in intensity of search for confirming evidence. On the other 
hand, the threat the organization feels, as represented by the perceived pressure to change, 
leads to a reduction in the information processing capacity and hence, increase in information 
overload, which, in turn, constitutes the second factor increasing the intensity of search for 
confirming evidence. The more confirming evidence the organization has, the more confident 
it becomes with the chosen strategy (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978; Hogarth and Makridakis, 
1981; Schwenk, 1986). This confidence counters the perceived pressure to change. The more 
the confidence is the less likely will be change. These relationships add further feedback 
loops into the model.  
The link between pressure to change and information processing capability (figure 5, the 
inner loop) is represented as a bell-shaped curve as the literature dictates (e.g. Staw et al., 
1981). Being under high pressure, the organization would like to get out of the unfavorable 
situation as soon as possible. Hence, the vigilance in information search and processing 
would decrease, leading to an organization that has less processing capability both in terms of 
capacity and quality. On the other hand, when the pressure is very low, the organization does 
not feel the need to scan the environment and thus, has low processing capacity and quality. 
As a result, the capability is low at low values of perceived pressure and it increases as the 
pressure increases. But if pressure rises above a certain level then the capability starts to 
decrease. Hence, a bell-shaped curve. It would be possible and desirable to separate these 
positive and negative relationships between these two variables into two causal pathways. For 
instance, it could be that when pressure increases the stress increases leading to lower 
capability and when pressure increases the need for new information increases leading to 
higher capability. However, since the literature is silent regarding these paths, we have 
decided to use the bell-shaped curve that is used in the literature. 
                                                   
5 Cognitive abilities are “the abilities of the decision unit to interpret information, generate options creatively, 
calculate and make choices between alternative courses of action” (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). 
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Figure 5: Effects of commitment and information overload on confirmation bias and confidence 
 
Bias in internal information processing – Tendency to relate success to strategy – As 
commitment affects the external information processing; it also affects the internal 
information processing. Internal information processing refers to the information collection 
that leads to the perceived success of the strategy used. As external information, internal 
information can be biased too. If decision-makers are committed to their strategy then they 
will believe that the strategy is successful. As Schwenk (1984) states, “Decision-makers who 
believe that the company’s current strategy is successful may ignore information suggesting 
gaps between performance and expectations”. 
 In the model, this tendency, named as the tendency to relate success to strategy, is 
determined by the commitment to the strategy (figure 6). Higher commitment leads to a 
stronger tendency to show that the strategy is performing well. Consequently, the perceived 
performance is biased towards the expected performance.  
 We need to stress that perceived performance signifies two effects. In system dynamics, 
we use perceptions to refer to time delays in collecting and processing information. Decision-
makers cannot know the instantaneous performance; hence, the smoothing of information is 
incorporated into the perceived performance. However, the time delays are not the only 
factors playing a role in determining the perceptions. Bias is also part of the equation. If the 
decision maker is biased, for instance, in her information processing, so will be the perceived 
performance. This bias is incorporated by the tendency variable, which determines the 
relative weights the decision maker gives to the expected performance and the real 
performance measure (which is the average fit of strategy). Hence, the perceived performance 
is a weighted average of the expected performance and the average fit where the tendency is 
the weight given to the expected performance (see equation 1). As a result, the more biased 
the decision-maker is, the less will be weight for the real performance and the performance 
will be perceived to be higher than it actually is6. 
 
Perceived performance = Average fit of strategy *(1-Tendency) + Expected performance * Tendency  
Equation 1:  The perceived performance 
 
                                                   
6 Of course, if the real performance is already high (close to the expected performance level), the bias will not be 
as recognizable.  
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Figure 6: Tendency to relate success to strategy 
 
 
Having explained the model structure, we will now move on to model analysis. 
4. Model Behavior/Analysis 
 
As reactive theories of change, such as the punctuated equilibrium model (Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985) dictate, we will look at organizations’ change behavior in reaction to an 
environmental change. We will show that looking at the effects of single versus multiple 
biases in strategic change will make a difference for the outcomes of change processes. We 
will consider two different environmental change patterns (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997): 
 
Environment 1: One time (punctuated) change in the environment such as the sudden 
emergence of a breakthrough technology. This is created with a pulse function in the fit 
decrease due to environmental change. In the graphs, this type of change is referred to as 
pulse. 
 
Environment 2: Continuous, incremental changes in the environment such as constantly 
shifting market opportunities. This is created by defining a fit decay function in the fit 
decrease due to environmental change. The fit decays over time with an average lifetime of 
200 months. In the graphs, this type of change is referred to as decay. 
 
4.1 Base run  
 
The base model represents the mechanism that will lead to the start of change in the face of 
environmental change (change-generating mechanisms explained in section 3.1). In this 
structure, it is assumed that no biases interfere with the decision of change. The model is 
reactive in the sense that given a change in the environment, the organization would start 
changing to restore the fit of its strategy. If we assume that there are no biases interfering 
with the decision process, what would be the change behavior of the organization? The 
theories predict that once the organization realizes the lower performance, it will start 
changing. In figure 7 and 8, the behavior patterns under the two environmental conditions are 
presented. As expected, in an environment with one radical change (Pulse base change), the 
organization starts changing after a while and the change goes on till perfect fit is restored 
(after which the change comes to a halt) (figures 7 and 8). Change does not start immediately 
after an environmental change since it takes a while for the pressure to build up. In decay 
base change, an organization in a continuously changing environment is simulated. Theories 
 of organizational change are not specific about the reaction of organizations in such 
environments. Yet, Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) state that the incremental changes in the 
environment render the discontinuous reactions from organizations ineffective and 
organizations should learn to change continuously to be able to survive. This is what we see 
in decay base change. The organization starts changing to counteract the on-going 
environmental change and keeps on changing continuously (and incrementally) (figure 8) and 
eventually balances its fit (figure 7). At equilibrium, the amount of change started is at the 
magnitude of the fit erosion due to the environmental change. Hence, the resulting 
equilibrium fit level is dependent on the speed of environmental change. The slower the 
environment changes, the lower will be the gap between the equilibrium fit and the perfect 
fit. Other than the speed of environmental change, the implementation time influence this gap 
as well. If the change were implemented faster then the resulting fit would be higher.  
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  Figure 7: Base run –Fit of strategy   Figure 8: Base run- change in fit 
 
Under the assumption that there are no biases interfering with the decision-making process, 
the organization restores its strategic fit. However, as the extant literature shows, biases and 
heuristics do play a role in strategy making. Hence, we should consider their effects. 
 
4.2 Effects of external information processing biases: Confirmation bias and confidence 
 
We will first look at the effect of the confirmation bias and resulting (over)confidence. The 
confirmation bias takes place when the organization collects confirming evidence due to 
commitment to its strategy or as a reductionist technique to cope with the information 
overload. The more confirming evidence an organization collects, the more confident it 
becomes in its strategy and hence, opposes the change. The interplay between the confidence 
and the pressure to change determines the amount of new changes started.   
 In Figure 10, the results for pulse and decay environments are given (compared to the 
base runs presented in section 4.1, the simulation period is extended to see the overall 
behavior patterns better). In the pulse case, we see that the organization does not change at 
all. The reason is that the commitment to the strategy leads to the search for confirming 
information that subsequently leads to confidence. The confidence withholds the organization 
from changing (since only when the felt pressure is higher than confidence, change starts7). 
Since every period with no change leads to higher commitment and higher resulting 
confidence, the organization does not withdraw from its current strategy. The simulation 
results show that the organization can go on with a low-fit strategy. However, we should also 
                                                   
7 The strength of confidence or rather, the strength of the effects of commitment and information overload on 
confidence is very important here. If these relationships would be less strong then the confidence will be lower 
constituting a lower threshold to change. 
 consider that in real life, this might not be possible. An organization that does not fit its 
environment is bound to lose business and be defeated by its competitors. Hence, it is 
possible that if the organization does not change, its fit decays further over time and the 
organization eventually dies.  
The model has been tested with different levels of initial commitment and amounts of 
pulse. The initial commitment level does not have an effect on the results. A higher amount 
of pulse, for instance a loss of 70% of the fit, does lead to a change reaction restoring the fit 
back to its maximum level. This means that it takes a large amount of fit gap to generate 
enough pressure to overcome the confidence the organization has to its strategy. 
 In the decay environment, on the other hand, we see that the organization goes through 
periods of change rather than changing continuously. Before starting a change, the 
organization waits till its fit is quite low rather than changing as the environment changes. 
This is due to the high confidence caused by high commitment to strategy and low 
information processing capabilities. In the face of no change, the commitment to strategy 
keeps on building up and leads to the reinforcement of the confirmation bias and confidence. 
The pressure, on the other hand, keeps on increasing in the face of decreasing fit and leads to 
decrease in information processing capability, further information overload, and hence, 
confirmation bias and confidence.  
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Figure 10: Fit of strategy for an organization that is under the influence of confirmation bias. Two 
environmental conditions are considered: one-time change environment (pulse conf change) and 
incremental change environment (decay conf change). 
 
4.3 Effects of internal information processing bias: Tendency to relate success to change  
 
We will now look at the effect of internal information processing bias on the organizational 
change process. As explained before, being committed to a strategy, the organization might 
not perceive the performance indicators accurately and perceive the performance to be higher 
than it actually is. The base run is a special case where the tendency is assumed to be 0, 
meaning that the perception is not biased at all. In Figure 9, the behavior in pulse and decay 
environments is given. 
 As can be seen, the tendency to relate success to strategy affects the change process. In 
both cases, the tendency to relate success to the strategy leads to a delay in the start of the 
change as well as a sub-optimal strategy once the change ends. The tendency makes the 
organization perceive its performance better than it actually is. Pressure does not accumulate 
fast enough and therefore, the change is started later in time. Even when the change process 
 begins, the organization initiates fewer changes than required due to low pressure. Fewer 
changes mean longer duration before the fit can be restored and during this period, 
commitment keeps on building, further reinforcing the tendency to perceive the strategy 
successful. As a result, under both circumstances, the organization has low performance for a 
long period of time and ends up with a low equilibrium fit8. This is especially problematic for 
an organization in the decay situation where the organization is much too late in 
counterbalancing the on-going decay in fit. (Note: In the model, the expected performance 
that is used for the tendency is assumed to be the perfect performance of 100. Obviously, if 
the expected performance were lower, the effect of tendency would be decreased.) 
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Figure 9: Fit of strategy when the organization has a tendency to see its performance better than it actually is. 
Two environmental conditions are considered: one-time change environment and incremental change 
environment. 
 
4.4 Combined effects of internal and external information processing biases 
 
So far, we have looked at the biases occurring in only internal processing or only external 
processing. However, in an organization, these two processes take place simultaneously. 
Hence, so do the biases. In figures 11 a and b, the behavior patterns corresponding to the 4 
different runs (no bias, only internal information processing biases, only external information 
processing biases, external and internal information processing biases together) are 
compared. Figures 11 a and b correspond to pulse and decay environments, respectively. We 
see that under both circumstances, the joint effect of the internal and external processing 
biases leads to the demise of the organization. In the pulse case, the organization does not 
change at all and keeps on having a low-fit strategy. In the decay case, on the other hand, the 
organization continuously loses fit and eventually dies. 
The tendency bias generates a delay in the building up of the pressure. The confirmation 
bias and confidence on the other hand generate a high barrier to the start of a change process. 
During this combined delay, the commitment keeps on building further reinforcing both the 
internal and external processing biases. The ever-increasing pressure, on the other hand, 
causes information overload leading to further confirmation bias and confidence. The result is 
an organization that cannot generate a change process. The combined effect of the biases 
generates a worse situation than were we not to look at the biases or look at them in isolation 
from one another.  
                                                   
8 Once again, the implementation time has an effect on both of these measures. Lower implementation time 
would mean faster recovery of the fit. Yet, with respect to the comparison of the behavior of base vs. tendency 
cases, the value of the constant does not make a difference. 
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Figure 11: Fit of strategy compared in four different runs: no biases are assumed to occur (base run), only 
internal information processing biases are considered (tend), only external information processing biases 
are considered (conf), internal and external information processing biases are considered (whole). Two 
environmental conditions are considered: (a) one-time change environment (pulse) and (b) incremental 
change environment (decay).  
5. Further Look into Commitment 
 
In the previous section, we showed that looking at biases simultaneously rather than in 
isolation and basing analysis on feedback loops generates interesting insights. Such an 
analysis shows us the effects of the interactions of the biases.  
 
When only external or only internal information processing biases are considered, the 
organizational change process leads to lock-in to sub-optimal strategy in a one-time change 
environment and to an ineffective manner of coping with environmental change in a 
continuously changing environment. When all the biases are taken together, the organization 
cannot recover to its full strength and in certain circumstances, it dies. These results would 
suggest that since all organizations suffer from biases, there would be no organization to 
 perform at its full strength. This could indeed be true since the successful organizations are 
those that outperform their competitors. A most successful company in a given environment 
does not necessarily perform at its best but it does perform better than others in the same 
environment. Hence, the fittest organizations survive. Looking at the results involving the 
decay environment, we can further speculate that all the organizations in a continuously 
changing environment would die. This, of course, is not necessarily true although as the 
population ecology literature would advocate, it is possible that organizations die and new 
ones replace them. Yet, there are organizations that survive in continuously changing 
environments. There can be two reasons to why we cannot replicate this case. First of all, it 
might be that such organizations have different change generating mechanisms than the 
reactive one we have assumed in our model. The other reason could be the way such 
organizations handle commitment to strategy controlling its adverse effects in difficult times. 
The latter factor is an interesting one to look into since by managing their commitment, 
organizations can cope with biases. In this way, they can also generate new change 
mechanisms. 
 
Analysis of section 4 demonstrates the importance of commitment to strategy in determining 
the course of a change process. Commitment and its effect on the other biases can explain 
why change attempts take too long to start (and why organizations do not change and die), 
why organizations get locked into low performing strategies, and why change efforts do not 
accumulate to bring an organization to a full-fit strategy. 
 
In the organizational change literature, organizational inertia is given as the main cause 
behind these behavioral outcomes. Inertia is seen as the resistance of an organization to 
change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Yet, inertia is a concept that has not been analyzed in 
detail. The causes of inertia and the policies organizations can use to decrease their inertia 
(when in trouble) are not very clear. There are interesting similarities between the concept of 
inertia and commitment to strategy. It could be that the causes leading to commitment to 
strategy are similar or the same as the causes leading to the accumulation of inertia. Hence, 
links between the inertia literature and the escalation of commitment literature might prove to 
be fruitful.  
 
Different organizational theorists have different opinions of inertia. Some suggest that inertia 
is resistance to all kinds of change and hence, organizations cannot change (e.g., Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). If the environment were to change, organizations with high inertia would 
die. Others suggest that inertia is resistance to all other than radical change (e.g., Tushman 
and Romanelli, 1985), hence, organizations can change radically if faced with high 
performance gaps. The same dichotomy seems to exist in the commitment literature. Some 
suggest that commitment to a course of action will disable the organization from changing 
(e.g., various works of Staw and his colleagues). Others suggest that in the face of 
performance pressures, the organization will withdraw from the current action and adopt 
another (e.g., Northcraft and Wolf, 1984 and Lant and Hurley, 1999). 
 
In our analysis, we have assumed that performance pressures do not affect the commitment to 
strategy (following the line of reasoning by Staw et al.) or rather, we can say that even in the 
face of low performance, the commitment keeps on building up. It is only when the strategy 
changes that commitment declines. This approach to commitment leads to the death of the 
organization. Such behavior patterns are supported by case studies of Staw and his 
colleagues, where organizations committed to a course of action kept on supporting it, even 
though the organization had very low performance results. These effects are rather similar to 
 those suggested by the organizational researchers advocating the detrimental effects of 
inertia.  
 
Although supported in the literature, failure due to commitment and inertia is not the only 
behavior pattern possible. Some organizations do change successfully. Whereas the inertia 
literature is silent regarding how inertia can decline to allow change, there is information 
regarding how commitment might be declining in some organizations. There is a point of 
view regarding how performance affects commitment. Some researchers support the idea that 
in the face of negative performance feedback, commitment de-escalates and organizations 
withdraw from action. Once again, these researchers have presented real cases where such 
withdrawal took place. 
 
We have incorporated this factor into our model to see the dynamic consequences of different 
forms of commitment determinants. We have assumed that the fraction of decline in 
commitment is dependent on the perceived pressure to change. Hence, when the organization 
is under high pressure (meaning that the organization perceives a large performance gap) the 
commitment decline is also high. Figure 12 represents the behavior of an organization in 
which performance feedback affects the commitment to strategy is compared to one in which 
performance pressures are of no effect. Figures 12 a and b refer to the pulse and decay 
environment, respectively. As the literature suggests, the use of performance feedback to 
update commitment to strategy enables change. When the commitment is decreased the 
organization becomes less biased both in internal and external information processing tasks. 
As a result, the organization gets a more “correct” perception of its environment and 
performance. Thus, the change starts.  
 Yet, we should realize that the late reaction to changes in the environment still presents 
itself as a problem. Moreover, in the continuously changing environment, due to this delay in 
reacting to change, the organization cannot achieve continuous change.  
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Figure 12: Consequences of different determinants of commitment. Two environmental conditions are 
considered: (a) one-time change environment (pulse) and (b) incremental change environment (decay).  
 
At this point, the reader might be interested in knowing what this second formulation means 
for our results of section 4. The comparison for different sub-models is represented in figure 
13. As can be seen, considering the effects of individual vs. multiple biases does still affect 
the consequences experienced by the organization. In both environments, there is a 
considerable long delay before the change starts (hence, the organization has performance 
problems for a long period, not a desirable situation for any organization) and in the 
continuously changing environment, the organization is not able to generate effective changes 
that will bring it in phase with the environment. 
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Figure 13: Fit of strategy compared in four different runs when the commitment is affected by the 
performance pressures: no biases are assumed to occur (base run), only internal information processing 
biases are considered (tend), only external information processing biases are considered (conf), internal and 
external information processing biases are considered (whole). Two environmental conditions are 
considered: (a) one-time change environment (pulse) and (b) incremental change environment (decay).  
 
6. Discussions and Conclusions  
 
The analysis of the joint effects of multiple biases is missing in the literature. There is a 
strong need for such a perspective since only by looking at the whole picture, further insights 
can be gained as to how biases affect the organizational outcomes. In this paper, we have 
looked into the joint effects of information processing biases on the strategic change process. 
We have shown that looking at isolated effects of individual biases generates different 
behavioral outcomes than looking at the simultaneous effects of multiple biases. From a 
system dynamics perspective, it might be obvious that the behavior patterns change when 
new feedback loops are added. Yet, showing the differences generated in behavior patterns is 
very valuable for setting research goals for behavioral decision-making and organizational 
change literature streams. As such, we are able to show that the analysis and research focus in 
these areas should be shifted towards understanding the joint effects of biases and how to 
overcome one bias in the presence of others.  
 
We have also seen that as we added more biases into our analysis, the results got 
progressively worse. For instance, the reaction time to start changing increased and 
organizations got locked into low performing strategies. This raises the question of what 
would happen if we were to extend this model to include other biases we did not look at so 
far. Would the results get worse and worse? Even though we cannot answer this question 
without doing the modeling, the analysis of section 5 could generate some insights. 
Comparing the results where only the tendency to relate success to strategy bias (called 
tendency bias from now on) was active to the results where all the biases were active, we can 
spot two counter-intuitive results. First of all, under the influence of all the biases, the 
organization is able to attain a higher fit than under the influence of only the tendency bias. 
This might mean that the confirmation bias and the resulting confidence in strategy actually 
 take away some of the negative effects of the tendency bias. The fact that the organization 
waits a while before reacting leads to high pressure, which generates the necessary amount of 
change to reach a full-fit strategy in the pulse case. In the decay case, on the other hand, the 
organization does achieve higher fit levels. Yet, these are temporary and the organization has 
periods with lower-fit strategy as well. It would be interesting to investigate which of the two 
situations is more beneficial to the organization. Is it better to have a continuous moderate fit 
or to have periods of high fit alternated with periods of low fit? 
We can also extend this discussion to include the possible effects of factors that are not 
included in the model. In the situation where only the tendency bias is considered, the 
organization keeps on changing continuously to counter-balance the environmental change. 
In the situation where all the biases are active, the organization has periods of change and 
periods of stability. Literature on success of change would support the idea that most change 
processes end up being unsuccessful because the changes cannot be effectively implemented 
due to the resistance of the employees (Nadler 1981). One of the causes of this resistance is 
prolonged periods of instability: “Individuals in organizations can only stand so much 
uncertainty and turbulence”. The overload of duration and amount of change going on may 
create dysfunctional effects such as extreme defensive behavior and resistance to any 
proposed change (Nadler 1981, Bennebroek Gravenhorst et. al. 1999). Hence, if we were to 
include the effects of resistance to change and implementation success we could see that the 
case with all the biases involved results in better performance than the case with only the 
tendency bias.  
Following this discussion, we can be in a position to propose that when more and more 
biases are involved in a decision-making activity some of the adverse effects might cancel 
each other out, leaving the organization better off. 
 
Another insight we can generate from this modeling work is the similarity between the 
concepts of commitment to strategy and inertia. It is possible that organizational inertia can 
be explained in terms of commitment. How inertia accumulates and de-accumulates are not 
well established in the literature whereas its effect on the change process is very fundamental. 
The link between these two literature streams might generate improvements for the 
understanding of the inertia concept. 
 
There is a controversy in the commitment to strategy literature regarding the effects of 
negative performance feedback on commitment. In order to investigate the behavioral 
consequences of the two viewpoints, we have incorporated both into the model and compared 
the results. If the commitment declines with negative performance feedback then the 
organization can change whereas ignoring negative performance feedback causes the 
organization to get locked into a low-fit strategy and even die.  Given the drastic difference in 
the organizational outcomes, it is desirable to focus further research efforts on identifying 
how commitment really declines and why certain organizations choose one de-escalation 
strategy over the other. Understanding these causes would generate a basis for identifying the 
leverage points for effective and timely de-escalation of commitment. Since commitment is 
beneficial in certain circumstances (such as stable or very volatile environments), it should 
also be researched when commitment should de-escalate. Thus, we would propose that the 
literature should focus its attention on how to manage commitment rather than generating 
more and more cases in showing that commitment exists. Understanding how commitment 
can be handled effectively could lead to major understanding of how change processes can be 
carried out more effectively.  
 
 There are several limitations to the model and the analysis. As explained before, the aim of 
this study was not to show how all the biases are related to each other but to show that 
inclusion of the interaction of biases into the analysis does lead to different insights. Yet, a 
further, more detailed modeling would enhance our understanding of the effects of biases in 
decision-making. In this respect, our effort should be seen as a starting point. 
 
We believe that we have shown some important information processing biases. However, the 
model should be expanded and improved to validate the results of our analysis. For instance, 
we have not included the processes that cause the accumulation of commitment. Literature 
streams such as escalation of commitment give a more detailed account of the factors that 
affect the commitment to a strategy. Including these causes explicitly would increase the 
validity of the model and could generate further insights. 
 The drifting goals structure could also be an interesting extension. Erosions in required 
performance (and even expected performance) would lead to further delays in change 
processes, and possibly, to further deterioration of the resulting strategic fit. 
 
From an organizational change point of view, factors affecting the success of change 
processes, such as implementation success and the appropriateness of the newly chosen 
strategy are very important. Such success factors could also be affected by the biases that are 
included in this model. For instance, the appropriateness of strategy depends on the 
information processing capabilities of the organization. A decline in the quality of 
information processing could lead to the implementation of inappropriate strategies that could 
further deteriorate the fit of the organization. Extending the bias with such factors and their 
relations to the biases would be desirable. 
 
We have assumed that the tendency to relate success to strategy causes the perception of 
performance to be higher than the actual when commitment is high. It is also possible that 
under low commitment, the organization perceives its performance to be lower than the 
actual. As Schwenk (1984) points out: “ Those who believe it [company’s current strategy] is 
failing may overweight information on gaps between performance and expectation”. Such a 
bias could have both positive and negative effects. It could, under environmental change 
conditions, decrease the delay in reaction. It could, on the other hand, also lead to 
unnecessary change when the organization is actually performing well.  
 
Even though the model has the above-explained limitations, we believe that given the 
interesting results it shows, this is a promising area of research that should be pursued in the 
future. 
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 Appendix: Equation Listing 
 
Perceived performance = Average fit of strategy * (1-Tendency to relate success to strategy) + 
Expected performance * Tendency to relate success to strategy 
 ~ performance units 
 ~ Perceived performance is the performance as the organization feels it. It has two 
aspects. It depends on the average fit of the strategy. On the other hand, the performance is biased 
towards expected performance depending on how committed the organization is to its current 
strategy. 
 
Average fit of strategy = SMOOTH(Fit of Strategy,4) 
 ~ performance units 
 
Commitment decrease = 0 * Commitment to strategy * Commitment decrease fraction + 
MIN(Commitment to strategy, Commitment to strategy  * Change percentage) 
 ~ commitment units/week 
 ~ The amount of decrease in commitment per week. The formulation " 
MIN(Commitment to strategy,Commitment to strategy * Change percentage)" is used to simulate the 
situation where commitment decreases only as a result of change in strategy. This formulation is used 
for the analysis of section 4. The second formulation,  "Commitment to strategy*Commitment 
decrease fraction" is used to simulate the situation where commitment decreases as a result of 
performance pressures. This formulation is used for the analysis of section 5. 
 
Change in fit = Change completed 
 ~ performance units/week 
 ~ This is the amount of change in fit as a result of implemented changes. 
 
Tendency to relate success to strategy = Table for tendency(Commitment to strategy) 
 ~ Dmnl 
 ~ Signifies the bias in performance measure. It is equivalent to the weight given to the 
expected performance. 1-tendency is the weight given to the objective performance measure of fit. 
 
Pulse amount = 50 
 ~ performance units/week 
 
Fit decrease due to environmental change = 0*Fit of Strategy/Fit wear off time + pulse amount* 
PULSE( 5 ,1) 
 ~ performance units/week 
 ~ The formulation “Fit of Strategy/Fit wear off time” is used to simulate the decay 
environment and the formulation “pulse amount* PULSE( 5 ,1)” is used to simulate the pulse 
environment 
 
New change started = (Required performance - Perceived performance-Change in Process) * IF Then 
Else ((Perceived pressure to change -confidence in strategy)>0, Perceived pressure to change-
confidence in strategy, 0) 
 ~ performance units/week 
 ~ Amount of new changes started per week. 
 
Effect of perceived pressure to change on information processing capacity = Table for effect on 
information processing capacity (Perceived pressure to change) 
 ~ Dmnl 
 
 Commitment decrease fraction = Table for commitment decrease fraction(Perceived pressure to 
change) 
 ~ 1/week 
 
Perceived pressure to change = SMOOTH(Pressure to change, 26) 
 ~ pressure units 
 
Performance correction = (Performance gap-Average performance gap)/Delay performance gap 
 ~ performance units/week 
 
Exerted pressure to change = Table for pressure by performance gap(Relative performance gap) 
 ~ pressure units 
 
Change completed = Change in Process/Implementation time 
 ~ performance units/week 
 ~ Amount of change that is completed (implemented) per week. 
 
Commitment increase = (1-Commitment to strategy)/"Commitment build-up time" 
 ~ commitment units/week 
 ~ The increase in commitment per week. Commitment increases continuously.  
 
Confidence in strategy = Normal confidence * Intensity of search for confirming evidence 
 ~ pressure units 
 ~ The total amount of confidence in strategy. It can be seen as the pressure to not 
change since it works as a threshold against change. 
 
Table for commitment decrease fraction( [(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,0),(0.155294,0.0284698),(0.254118,0.0782918),(0.369412,0.209964),(0.451765,0.359431),(
0.5,0.5),(0.550588,0.679715),(0.614118,0.822064),(0.672941,0.903915),(0.748235,0.950178),(0.804
706,0.97153),(0.856471,0.985765),(0.910588,0.989324),(1,1)) 
 
Normal confidence = 0.5 
 ~ pressure units 
 ~ Normal amount of confidence an org feels towards its strategy. 
 
Table information overload( 
  [(0,0)-
(2,1)],(0,0),(0.225882,0.0284698),(0.348235,0.0676157),(0.494118,0.117438),(0.64,0.181495),(0.771
765,0.24911),(0.884706,0.359431),(1,0.5),(1.11529,0.615658),(1.20941,0.701068),(1.44471,0.85053
4),(1.56235,0.914591),(1.71765,0.975089),(1.83059,0.992883),(2,1)) 
 
Initial fit = 100 
 ~ performance units 
 
Initial commitment = 0.5 
 ~ commitment units 
 
Commitment to strategy = INTEG (Commitment increase-Commitment decrease, initial commitment) 
 ~ commitment units 
 ~ Signifies the total amount of commitment the organization has to its strategy. 
Commitment ranges from 0 to 1. Commitment of 1 means that the organization is totally supporting 
its current strategy. 
 
Fit of Strategy = INTEG (Change in fit-Fit decrease due to environmental change, initial fit) 
 ~ performance units 
  ~ Signifies the fit of organization's strategy to the strategy demanded by the 
environment. Fit of strategy is a sign of organization's performance. 
 
Acceptable performance gap = 0 
 ~ performance units 
 
Relative performance gap = (Average performance gap-Acceptable performance gap)/100 
 ~ performance units 
 ~ Signifies the difference of the existing performance gap from the acceptable 
performance gap. The difference is divided by 100 for scaling purposes. 
 
Table for tendency( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,0),(0.141176,0.024911),(0.24,0.103203),(0.341176,0.217082),(0.416471,0.352313),(0.5,0.5),
(0.618824,0.626335),(0.724706,0.697509),(0.863529,0.736655),(1,0.75)) 
 
Expected performance = 100 
 ~ performance units 
 ~ The total expexted performance of the strategy. The expected performance is assumed 
to be equal to the maximum fit a strategy can have. 
 
Intensity of search for confirming evidence = table commitment(Commitment to strategy)+table 
information overload(Information overload) 
 ~ Dmnl 
 
Table commitment( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,0),(0.117647,0.0177936),(0.197647,0.0462633),(0.275294,0.088968),(0.331765,0.163701),(
0.390588,0.263345),(0.432941,0.348754),(0.5,0.5),(0.534118,0.622776),(0.571765,0.72242),(0.6211
76,0.80427),(0.694118,0.875445),(0.748235,0.914591),(0.804706,0.953737),(0.870588,0.985765),(1,
1)) 
 
Available information =  2 
 ~ 
~ Amount of available information 
 
Normal information processing capacity = 0.5 
 ~  
 ~ Amount of information that can be handled under normal pressure. 
 
Information handling capability = Normal information processing capacity * Effect of perceived 
pressure to change on information processing capacity 
 ~  
 ~ Amount of information that can be handled 
 
Table for effect on information processing capacity( 
 [(0,0)-(1,2)],(0,0.04),(0.0447059,1.08185),(0.0611765,1.40214),(0.1,1.75),(0.145882, 
1.90036),(0.2,2),(0.3,2),(0.4,1.94306),(0.447059,1.91459),(0.5,1.83),(0.6,1.57),(0.661176,1.37367),(0
.7,1.18),(0.727059,0.982206),(0.757647,0.782918),(0.778824,0.697509),(0.8,0.58363),(0.851765,0.3
91459),(0.894118,0.263345),(0.931765,0.170819),(1,0.12)) 
 
Pressure change = (Exerted pressure to change - Pressure to change)/Pressure build up time 
 ~ pressure units/week 
 
Performance gap = Required performance-Perceived performance 
  ~ performance units 
 
Information overload = Available information-Information handling capability 
 
Average performance gap = INTEG (Performance correction, 1e-006) 
 ~ performance units 
 
Change in Process = INTEG (New change started-Change completed, 0) 
 ~ performance units 
 ~ Change in Process signifies the amount of ongoing changes in the organization. It is 
measured in terms of the amount of fit gap to be closed as a result of the on-going changes.  
 
Change percentage = ABS(ZIDZ(Change in fit, Fit of Strategy)) 
 ~ 1/week 
 
Delay performance gap = 4 
 ~ week 
 
Fit wear off time = 200 
 ~ week 
 
"Commitment build-up time" = 60 
 ~ week 
 
Implementation time = 26 
 ~ week 
 
Pressure build up time = 8 
 ~ week 
 
Pressure to change = INTEG (Pressure change, 0) 
 ~ pressure units 
 ~ Amount of pressure the organization feels given the performance gap. This pressure 
dictates the percentage of the gap that should be closed in the fit of the strategy. 
 
Required performance = 100 
 ~ performance units 
 
Table for pressure by performance gap( 
 [(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.1247,0.04626),(0.2282,0.1139),(0.3176,0.2598),(0.3929,0.4235)
 ,(0.4471,0.5979),(0.52,0.79),(0.5906,0.9324),(0.7,1),(0.8,1),(0.9,1),(1,1)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
